A CHILD'S RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM TRANSFER
TRAUMA IN A CONTESTED ADOPTION CASE
SUELLYN SCARNECCHIA"

On August 2, 1993, I arrived at the home of Jan, Robby, and Jessica
DeBoer' a few hours before the transfer. At 2:00 P.M. I would carry Jessica
out of her home and deliver her to the parents who had won the case,2 her
biological mother and father. This task probably would have been easier had
I not spent eight days in the trial court listening to the experts explain that
this transfer from one set of parents to another would harm Jessica.3 It
would have been easier had I not recently obtained affidavits from other experts to persuade the United States Supreme Court to delay the transfer
until the Court could consider the case.' The experts confirmed what I felt
in my heart and what I saw in the faces and heard in the voices of thousands who protested the transfer-losing the parents she loved as her own
would hurt Jessica. It would hurt her deeply now, and it might hurt her in
various ways as she matured5 Yet, I carried her outside that day, as she

*

Clinical Professor of Law, University of Michigan-Law School, Child Advocacy Law

Clinic.
1. Jessica's name was changed by her birth parents after she left the DeBoers. She is
now known as Anna Schmidt. Michele Ingrassia & .Karen Springen, She's Not Baby Jessica
Anymore, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1994, at 60. For a detailed summary of the factual and proce-

dural history of the Baby Jessica case, see generally Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration:
The Uniform Adoption Act, the DeBoer-Schmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2
DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 15 (No. 1 1995).

2. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied the DeBoers custody of Jessica based on the
rights of her biological father, who had never consented to the adoption. In re Clausen
(DeBoer v. Schmidt), 502 N.W.d 649 (Mich. 1993). Her biological mother had not named the
correct man as the father at the time of the adoption. Id. at 652.
3. The trial judge granted the DeBoers custody of Jessica; his opinion was later reversed
due to lack of jurisdiction and the DeBoers' lack of standing. Justice Levin of the Michigan
Supreme Court cited the trial judge's conclusion in his dissent: "'We had different- degrees of
testimony from the experts. All the way from permanent, serious damage ... down to the
child would recover in time. But every expert testified that there would be serious traumatic
injury to the child at this time."' In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting).
4. The petition for a stay was denied by Justice Stevens. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct.
1 (1993). Upon reapplication, it was rejected by the full court, with Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor dissenting. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
5. The removal of a child from an established family has been likened to kidnapping.
Jeree H. Pawl, Ph.D., Director of Infant-Parent Program at San Francisco General Hospital,
who has more than thirty years of experience treating young children and their parents,
wrote in her affidavit.
Jessica, in being removed from her current "parents," will be transported into
a nightmare and it is one which will never end. The feelings she will experience
cannot be resolved. Perhaps the most compelling way to try to imagine it is to
think of it as a kidnapping. Legally it is certainly not a kidnapping, but psychologically, that is exactly what it is from the point of view of Jessica....
The most impor-
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screamed for her mommy and daddy, and I delivered her to the people she
would need to learn to love as her new parents.
This introduction and the accompanying brief describe my argument
that a child like Jessica has a right to due process protections when she is
likely to suffer transfer trauma caused by a change of custody. Jessica was
not protected by the legal system. This is an argument meant to benefit
other children facing the loss of their established families.
Unfortunately, many children, including those who suffer abuse or
neglect and those whose parents die, experience separation from or loss of
their parents. When parents die, however, children often stay with their
family, comforted by the familiarity that grandparents, cousins, pets, and
well-known places provide. Children usually have the opportunity to remember their parents with love. In addition, children separated from parents
due to abuse or neglect often can visit their parents,7 and many children in
foster care receive services to help them cope with the separation, as well as
any former abuse, from their parents. In Jessica's case, the DeBoers did not
die, nor did they abuse or neglect her. They were willing and able to continue their relationship with her. Yet, the legal system imposed on Jessica
the trauma associated with the death of her parents8 and deemed that her
interests were irrelevant to the case. 9

tant people in her world upon whom she depends for everything and for the central understanding of herself and of the world are missing. This is just the beginning for Jessica. The terror and confusion as to where her "parents" are and why it
is that they don't come will not be resolved. The yearning, the fear and the sorrow
are dreadful and it is only the beginning.
I cannot predict exactly the course for Jessica if this shift occurs but I do
know that it will change her forever. There will be a darkness, a sadness, a lack of
trust, anxiety and fear within her relationships forever. That will be her legacy. This
is true whether she "remembers" or not.
Application for Stay of Mandate at 19a, DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993) (Nos. A-64, A65) (application for stay filed in case no. A-65 before consolidation of the two cases).
6. See Appendix at 48 (Brief at i).
7. See, e.g., MICH. COmP. LAws § 712A.18f(3) (1992) (requiring that children in foster care
visit their parents at least once a week, unless doing so would be detrimental to child).
8. Dr. Elissa P. Benedek, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Michigan, Director
of Training and Research at the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, and the former President of
the American Psychiatric Association, stated in her affidavit:
Notwithstanding whatever adult reasons might exist for such a transfer of custody,
Jessica, at the age of 2 years and 5 months, will experience this change of custody
as a complete loss of everyone she has grown to love. She will experience this as
the death of her parents, the DeBoers. She will not be grieving one death, but two
deaths.
. She will blame herself for the loss of her family. She will believe that she
was a bad girl, or that she did not love her parents enough or that she did or said
or thought one bad thing which made her parents give her away to someone
else.... Even if she later comes to understand what happened to her in more
adult ways, her personality will be changed by blaming herself for this very traumatic loss.
Application for Stay of Mandate, supra note 5, at 3a.
9. See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992); In re Clausen (DeBoer v. Schmidt),
502 N.W.2d 649, 660-62 (Mich. 1993).
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I do not recommend that other attorneys experience this tragedy. That
heart-breaking day, however, motivated me and many others into action. We
resolved that more children should not suffer Jessica's fate. Those concerned
now focus media and public attention on cases involving the rights of children."0 Others advocate for constitutional amendments to provide a legal
safety net for children." And many are asking state legislatures to eliminate
the gaps in adoption laws that lead to such turmoil in children's lives.12
Better legislation will prevent some of these tragic cases, but legislative
change is not a panacea. Can we prevent a mother from lying about the
identity of the birth father? Can we ensure that attorneys follow required
procedures" in every case? Will agencies and courts adequately pursue
fathers' identities when required?14 There are fifty different state adoption
systems and a variety of ways in which an unwed biological father's interests may be thwarted by mothers, attorneys, adoptive parents, or agencies.
Litigation continues to pit the rights of a child against the rights of his or
her birth father. Since Jessica left Michigan to live in Iowa, other state supreme courts have decided or are poised to decide: whose child is this?

10. Hear My Voice: Protecting Our Nation's Children (HMV) was formed on August 2,
1993; the organization was initially known as the DeBoer Committee for Children's Rights
(DCCR). Since its formation, HMV has grown nationwide to include 56 chapters in 37 states.
The organization engages in advocacy and support for families involved in cases in which
courts refuse to consider children's interests. Employing the media and public action, HMV
has kept the issue of children's rights in the public consciousness.
11. The National Task Force for Children's Constitutional Rights and the National Committee for the Rights of the Child are two organizations which advocate for constitutional
amendments.
12. Several state legislatures have reformed their adoption statutes since Jessica's transfer.
Notably, in August of this year, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted a Uniform Adoption Act for submission to the states. The Act addresses many
of the issues raised in cases like Jessica's. See generally UNIF. ADOPTION AcT (1994). For more
information on the Uniform Adoption Act, see Hollinger, supra note 1, at 15. See also Act of
May 12, 1994, § 2, 1994 Iowa Acts H.F. 2377 (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 144.12A) (establishing a paternity registry for birth fathers to register their right to notice if their child is
placed for adoption); Act of May 12, 1994, § 14, 1994 Iowa Acts H.F. 2377 (to be codified at
IOWA CODE § 600A.4) (providing criminal penalties for a biological mother who falsifies the
father's identity on adoption papers).
13. In the Baby Jessica case, the attorney for the prospective adoptive parents obtained
the birth mother's release of parental rights before the statutory waiting period, 72 hours, had
passed. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 243. The attorney for the prospective adoptive parents in
the Baby Richard case failed to inform the court that the birth mother knew the identity of
the birth father but that she refused to disclose it. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (111.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). In the Baby Emily case, the attorney for the prospective adoptive
parents learned of the father's intent to contest the adoption before the birth of the baby, but
failed to reveal this information to the birth parents and the court. In re Adoption of Baby
E.A.W. (G.W.B. v. J.S.W.), 647 So. 2d 918, 930-31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Pariente, J., con-

curring).
14. See In re Adoption of JJ.B. (Roth v. Bookert), 868 P.2d 1256, 1258 (N.M. Ct. App.
1993) (despite knowledge of birth father's objections, adoption agency failed to provide him
with proper notice of adoption proceedings), cert. granted, 869 P.2d 820 (N.M. 1994).
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Baby Richard"5 and Baby Emily 6 are examples of thwarted father cases that have received significant media attention; however, other states have
also reached decisions on this issue. 7 These state decisions are based solely
15. In Illinois, Baby Richard's birth mother placed him for adoption, claiming that the
birth father was unknown. She told the birth father that the baby had died. The birth parents
had been living together during much of the pregnancy, but separated shortly before the
birth. When the birth father learned of the adoption, he came forward to contest it. Because
he had not come forward during the time limits under Illinois law, the trial court granted the
adoption over his protests. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 651 (i. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638
N.E.2d 181 (111.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed and
stated:
Fortunately, the time has long past [sic] when children in our society were
considered the property of their parents. Slowly, but finally, when it comes to children even the law has rid itself of the Dred Scott mentality that a human being can
be considered a piece of property "belonging" to another human being. To hold that
a child is the property of his parents is to deny the humanity of the child.
... In an adoption, custody or abuse case, however, the child is the real
party in interest.... [I]t
is his best interest and corollary rights that come before
anything else, including the interests and rights of biological and adoptive parents.
Id. at 651-52. For a sh'milar analysis, see Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976).
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and held that the child's best interests "should
never have been reached and need never have been discussed" by the court below. In re Doe,
638 N.E.2d at 182. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to both Baby Richard and his
prospective adoptive parents. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); Doe v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). The birth father petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for a writ of
habeas corpus, and, on the same day that oral arguments were heard, the Illinois Supreme
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus ordering the Does to surrender custody of Baby
Richard. In re Kirchner, No. 78101, 1995 WL 80012, at *1 (Ill.
Feb. 28, 1995) (per curiam).
In an attempt to block the immediate transfer, counsel for Baby Richard and the Does
applied for a stay in the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Stevens denied the stay, O'Connell v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891 (1995), and, upon reapplication, the full court denied the stay,
O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995), with Justices O'Connor and Breyer dissenting.
The birth father did not demand immediate transfer of the child; counsel for Baby Richard
and the Does are considering filing a new petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court, requesting review of the illinois Supreme Court's order of transfer. Telephone Interview with Laura A. Kaster, Attorney, Jenner & Block (Feb. 27, 1995) (Jenner & Block presently
represents the Does).
16. The Baby Emily case presented similar issues to the Florida Court of Appeals. On
first hearing, a panel of the court reversed the adoption and ordered the child transferred to
her birth father because he had not properly received an opportunity to consent to the adoption. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. (G.W.B. v. J.S.W.), No. 93-3040, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS
6137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 22, 1994), withdrawn, 647 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(en banc). The court granted the adoptive parents' request for rehearing en banc and affirmed
the adoption, finding that the birth father had in fact abandoned the baby and his consent to
the adoption was not required. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. (G.W.B. v. J.S.W.), 647 So. 2d
918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc). The members of the Court of Appeals, however, struggled with the question of what weight emotional abandonment by the birth father
should be given in determining "abandonment" under the Florida Adoption Code. The court
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
IN MAKING A DETERMINATION OF ABANDONMENT AS DEFINED BY SECTION 63.032(14), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1992), MAY A TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDER LACK OF EMOTIONAL SUPPORT AND/OR EMOTIONAL
ABUSE OF THE FATHER TOWARD THE MOTHER DURING PREGNANCY AS A
FACTOR IN EVALUATING THE "CONDUCT OF A FATHER TOWARDS THE

CHILD DURING PREGNANCY."
Id. at 924.
17. The adoption of four-year-old Kassen Roth is at issue in New Mexico. The New Mex-
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on the father's actions, without an analysis of the impact of the decision on
the child. 8 I argue, however, that a determination in a contested adoption
cannot be made without meaningful reference to the impact of the decision
on the child.
When an unwed biological father has not consented to an adoption,
some state courts have interpreted the constitutional rights of those fathers
as requiring the denial of the adoption and immediate transfer of the child to
the father. These courts fail to consider that the transfer affects the child.1 9
In response to such decisions, attorneys representing the adoptive parents
and children argue that the father's rights are not absolute. Citing Supreme
Court cases interpreting the rights of unwed fathers,?' they claim that courts
should balance children's rights against any rights of the fathers. The Supreme Court, however, has never recognized a child's independent right to
maintain familial relationships with nonbiological parents and has previously
declined to decide the issue.2' Thus, attorneys for adoptive parents and chil-

ico Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of the adoption, finding that the birth
father had been thwarted in his efforts to contest the adoption at the earliest stages of the
process and had not abandoned Kassen. In re Adoption of JJ.B. (Roth v. Bookert), 868 P.2d
1256, 1258-59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted, 869 P.2d 820 (N.M. 1994). The New Mexico
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the case in June, 1994; a decision is pending.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed an adoption in a similar case, finding that the
birth father had abandoned the child. In re Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 (Father in
Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 v. Adam), 876 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. 1994). The court employed a very liberal definition of abandonment. Although the court did not find that a child
had an independent right to have his interests considered, the justices noted the potential
harm to the child in requiring a transfer of custody to the birth father. Id. at 1133.
In a case strikingly similar to Baby Richard, the adoption of Michael H. has been contested by his birth father for over four years. Adoption of Michael H. (John S. v. Mark K.),
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 254 (Ct. App.), review granted, 877 P.2d 762 (Cal. 1994).
18. The concurring opinion of Judge Pariente in the Baby Emily case articulates the
court's inability to consider the child's interests, even though "the record in this case [indicates] that the child may possibly suffer serious psychological damage upon being removed
from the only home she has ever known." In re Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 925 (Pariente, J.,

concurring).
19. See, e.g., In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (ill.) (holding that father's interest in child was
sufficient to require his consent for adoption and that child's interests were irrelevant), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) (holding that parental
rights cannot be terminated solely because of child's best interests); In re Clausen (DeBoer v.
Schmidt), 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (holding that child has no right to hearing on her
own interests in custody case). But see In re Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 (Father in
Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 v. Adam), 876 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that
unwed father must persistently and vigorously assert legal rights to obtain full constitutional
protection of parent-child relationship).
20. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (unwed father who had not established paternity of two-year-old child not permitted to vacate child's adoption); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) (unwed father who had no relationship with child not permitted to prevent
child's adoption); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (unwed biological
father's due process rights not infringed upon by legal presumption that child born to married woman living with husband is child of the marriage); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (distinguishing the rights of unwed fathers who participate in the rearing of their children from those who do not).
21. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 110.
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dren argue for recognition of the child's right to protect his or her existing
relationships with nonbiological parents.
In addition to this argument that children have the right to protect their
established families, I offer the transfer trauma theory.' This argument is
based on a child's right to due process when state action, in the form of a
transfer of custody, is likely to cause substantial harm to the child. It is
based on the predicted harm to the child, the violation of the child's own
liberty, not on the child's right to protect an established family relationship.
In short, I argue that children have a constitutionally protected right to liberty in the form of security from state-imposed harm, including substantial
harm to their psychological and emotional welfare.
While representing the DeBoers, I repeatedly thought about the fact that
if Jessica were an adult, she would have a right to a hearing considering her
interests. Justice Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court also recognized that
Jessica's inability to speak for herself denied her the legal process that any
adult would demand.' The state deprives adults of their family and liberty
under only two circumstances: when involuntarily committed to a mental
health institution and when incarcerated. Even in these instances, adults may
correspond with the outside world, visit with family members, and perhaps
return home. The state, however, permanently isolates children in Jessica's
position from the homes they have known and loved. Some might blame the
Schmidts for denying Jessica contact with the DeBoers after the transfer of
custody.24 But it is the legal system that should take responsibility for ensuring the availability of continued contact.

The Child Advocacy Law Clinic at the University of Michigan has developed a legal argument concerning the constitutional rights of a child in a
contested adoption.2 This argument has been presented before the United
States Supreme Court, as well as the Florida and Illinois Supreme Courts.'

22. The term "transfer trauma" was used to describe the harm a patient was likely to
suffer if moved from one nursing home to another. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr.,
447 U.S. 773, 784, 802-03 (1980Y.
23. Justice Levin wrote:
If the danger confronting this child were physical injury, no one would question her right to invoke judicial process to protect herself against such injury. There is
little difference, when viewed from the child's frame of reference, between a physical assault and a psychological assault.
... It is only because this child cannot speak for herself that adults can
avert their eyes from the pain that she will suffer.
In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 689 (Levin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
24. The Schmidts have denied the DeBoers contact with Jessica. However, they are under
no legal obligation to consider the needs of the child for continued contact with her first
family. The court gave them "ownership." If they cannot or will not permit contact between
the DeBoers and the child, because of distrust, hatred, discomfort, fear, or any other reason,
they are not compelled by any law to do so. And, while she is a minor, Jessica cannot assert
her own right to contact the DeBoers.
25. See Appendix at 48 (Brief at i).
26. Brief for Concerned Professionals as Amicus Curiae, O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct.
1084 (1995) (No. A-555); Brief for DeBoer Committee for Children's Rights and Child Advocacy Law Clinic as Amicus Curiae, In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W. (G.W.B. v. J.S.W.), No.
84,819 (Fla. filed Jan. 18, 1995) (on file with Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy); Brief for
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We hope the argument will be of interest and practical value to attorneys
representing children in such cases. Children involved in contested adoptions
have the right to be considered persons who may be significantly affected by
the loss of their established families. It is imperative that this children's right
be explicitly recognized and aggressively protected.

Child Advocacy Law Clinic as Amicus Curiae, In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) (No.

76063).
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APPENDIX
INTRODUCTION

The following is a sample argument, in the form of a brief' directed
to the United States Supreme Court, appealing the decision of the Supreme
Court of State X which ordered the transfer of a child3 from his prospective
adoptive family to his biological family due to the birth father's failure to
consent to the adoption. The birth mother had consented to the adoption.

1. The sample arguments presented have been developed with the assistance of students
at the University of Michigan Law School, including Kate Northrup, Mark Carbonell, John
Clappison, Lisa O'Malley, Kristina Entner, Anne Auten, Kristin Donoghue, Ken Goldstein,
Lara Hutner, Kacy Kleinhans, Davia Schwartz, Gregory Stanton, and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer.
Professor Richard H. Pildes has provided helpful advice. Professor Joan H. Hollinger has
worked with me on various forms of the argument featured in the appendix and her assistance has been invaluable.
2. As this appendix is written in brief format, citations are included in the text and
follow the typeface conventions used by practitioners.
3. For the purposes of this brief, I have called this hypothetical child "John." However,
I have not created additional hypothetical facts. I note throughout the brief where further
development is needed.
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ARGUMENT

I.

FAILURE TO BALANCE THE RESPECrIVE RIGHT OF UNWED FATHERS AND
CHILDREN VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.

The Supreme Court of X has expanded the rights of unwed fathers in
contested adoption cases beyond the authority provided by the previous
decisions of this Court and, as a result, has violated the Constitutional rights
of John. The courts of other states are divided over the issue of how a
father's right to a child should be balanced against the child's right to stay
with his adoptive parents. Compare In re Juvenile Severance Action No. S114487 (Father in Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 v. Adam) 876 P.2d
1121 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that unwed father must persistently and vigorously assert legal rights to obtain full constitutional protection of parentchild relationship) and In re Adoption of Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607 (Ark. 1992)
(holding that a putative father with substantial relationship to child may be
denied notice of an adoption proceeding if he fails to register with the
state's putative father registry) and Appeal of H.R. (In re Baby Boy C.) 581
A.2d 1141 (D.C. 1990) (preference for fit unwed father who has "grasped his
opportunity interest" may be overridden only by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child's best interest to be placed with nonrelatives)
and In re Adoption of Baby Boy W.. 831 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1992) (holding that
child can be adopted without consent of birth father if he fails to exercise
parental rights and duties) with In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.) (holding that
father's interest in his child was sufficient to require his consent for adoption), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) and In re B.G.C. 496 N.W.2d 239
(Iowa 1992) (holding that termination of parental rights requires statutory
grounds, not solely consideration of the child's best interest) and In re
Clausen (DeBoer v. Schmidt) 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (holding that biological parents' right to custody is not to be disturbed absent showing of
parental unfitness, irrespective of child's preferences) and In re Adoption of
T.T.B. (Roth v. Bookert). 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that termination of parental rights on grounds of child's interest alone, absent showing of parental unfitness, does not satisfy constitutional due process), cert.
granted 869 P.2d 820 (N.M. 1994). This Court should provide guidance as X
and other states struggle with striking the appropriate balance between competing intrafamily interests.
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A. A Child Who is at Risk of Losing His Established Family Relationships
Has Constitutionally Protected Rights.
In reversing an order for adoption in a similar case, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
[T]he appellate court, wholly missing the threshold issue in this case, dwelt

on the best interests of the child. Since, however, the father's parental interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to reach the factor of
the child's best interests. That point should never have been reached and
need never have been discussed.

In re Doe 638 N.E.2d at 182 (emphasis added); see also In re B.G.C. 496
N.W.2d at 245 (holding that parental rights cannot be terminated solely because of child's best interest); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 665 (holding that
child has no right to hearing on her own best interests in custody case).
Under these decisions, a child of a legally defective adoption must relinquish
completely his relationship with his established family with no reference to
how the change of custody will affect him. This outcome treats the child as
an object to be possessed and not as a person under the Constitution.! A
child is a person with constitutional rights in the context of decisions concerning his custody.
1. The child has a right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
John's status as a minor does not deprive him of constitutional
protections afforded adults. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52,
74 (1976). "[Nleither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). This Court must recognize
that a child faced with the imminent loss of everyone he knows is a person
with due process rights.
The child in this case has two different grounds for asserting a right to
due process. First, John's liberty, in the most traditional sense, is at stake
when it is argued that the court should remove him from his home and
family, and physically move him somewhere else. The Fourteenth Amendment protects a citizen's right to be free from state-imposed removal from

1. In his dissent to In re Clausen, Justice Levin wrote:
I would agree with the majority's analysis if the DeBoers had gone to Iowa,
purchased a carload of hay from Cara Clausen [Schmidt], and then found themselves in litigation in Iowa with Daniel Schmidt ....
But this is not a lawsuit concerning the ownership, the legal title, to a bale of
hay. This is not the usual A v. B lawsuit ....
There is a C, the child, "a feeling, vulnerable, and [about to be] sorely put
upon little human being" .....

In re Clausen 502 N.W.2d at 668-69 (Levin, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemley v. Barr 343 S.E.2d
101, 104 (W. Va. 1986)).

54

DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 2:41

1995

one's home without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The
second ground for claiming due process protection for this child is his protected liberty interest in his relationship with his adoptive parents, see discussion infra part I.A.4. Thus, both John's right to live free from state-imposed infringements on his physical liberty without due process of law and
his right to protect his family relationship with his adoptive parents are at
stake here.
2. The child is likely to suffer grievous harm if his relationship with his
adoptive family is terminated.
The reversal of John's adoption by the Supreme Court of X, with no
acknowledgment of his interests, will require this child to lose his established family. In a similar case, a Michigan trial court concluded at the close
of a hearing on the best interests of the child that separation from the child's
established family would be traumatic. Later, the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the trial court opinion for lack of jurisdiction and standing; how-ever, the trial judge's opinion was cited with approval in the dissent: "[wle
had different degrees of testimony from the experts. All the way from permanent, serious damage ... down to the child would recover in time. But
every expert testified that there would be serious traumatic injury to the
2
child at this time." In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting).
Justice Levin further articulated the risk of minimizing a child's psycholog-

ical injury:
If the danger confronting this child were physical injury, no one would
question her right to invoke judicial process to protect herself against such
injury. There is little difference, when viewed from the child's frame of reference, between a physical assault and a psychological assault.
The law... has recognized that persons who suffer psychological

injury are entitled to the protection of the law. it is only because this child
cannot speak for herself that adults can avert their eyes from the pain that
she will suffer.

Id. at 689. The risk to John's psychological and emotional welfare posed by
this contested adoption mandates protection of his constitutional right to
security from state-imposed harm.

3. The threat to the child's well-being posed by a judicial determination that
does not take his interests into account triggers his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process.
A child has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in avoiding the
trauma caused by a state-imposed removal from his established family. This
Court has previously recognized that, when the state physically transfers an
2. See generally John Bowlby, Attachment 1 (1969); John Bowlby, Separation 1 (1973);
William Damon, Social and Personality Development, Infancy Through Adolescence 27-52
(1983); Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 1 (1973); Leslie M.
Singer et al., Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families. 56 Child Dev. 1543 (1985).
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individual from one residence to another and the individual is in danger of
suffering harm due to that transfer, the individual has a due process right to
be heard before the transfer occurs. See Addington v. Texas 441 U.S. 418
(1979); see also Vitek v. Tones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (holding that
"grievous loss" in transfer to mental hospital entitles prisoner to the procedural protections of the opportunity for notice and an adequate hearing before transfer).
In Addington appellant's mother filed a petition for his indefinite and
involuntary commitment to a mental institution. The Texas Supreme Court
concluded that application of a preponderance of the evidence standard was
sufficient to commit appellant. Addington 441 U.S. at 422. This Court reversed, holding that it would deprive appellant of procedural due process to
commit him merely on the basis of the preponderance standard. Id. at 432.
Appellant's due process right stemmed from the adverse social consequences
he would suffer if committed. "Whether we label this phenomena 'stigma' or
choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that
it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual." Id. at 426. On these grounds, the Court held that appellant had a due
process right to at least a clear and convincing finding that .he should be
institutionalized. Id. at 433.
While the Court did not rule on the validity of the "transfer trauma"
claim in O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr. 447 U.S. 773 (1980), 3 Justice
Blackmun in his concurring opinion acknowledged that an individual who
may suffer trauma as a result of being transferred from his or her state-appointed home is entitled to a due process hearing. He wrote that:
[A] governmental decision that imposes a high risk of death or serious illness on identifiable patients must be deemed to have an impact on their
liberty.... [Wlhere such drastic consequences attend governmental action,
their foreseeability, at least generally, must suffice to require input by those
who must endure them.
Id. at 803 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). After noting that the
threat of transfer trauma could require due process protections, Justice
Blackmun concurred in the holding that the plaintiffs did not have a right to
a pre-transfer hearing. However, he based his concurrence on the plaintiffs'
insufficient proof.'

3. The senior citizen plaintiffs argued that they had a right to a hearing on their interests before being transferred from their nursing home to another due to de-certification of
their home by Medicaid. According to experts, the patients would suffer "transfer trauma" if
moved; they argued that this harm was state-imposed. The Court held that the trauma, if
valid, only resulted indirectly from the regulations. O'Bannon 447 U.S. at 788-90.
4. He reasoned that the plaintiffs' proof of transfer trauma had not been fully developed
below, O'Bannon 447 U.S. at 802 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring), and found that they had
not "establish[ed] that transfer trauma is so substantial a danger as to justify the conclusion
that transfers deprive them of life or liberty." Id. at 804.
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The term "transfer trauma" is appropriate for the case at hand.
Distinguishable from O'Bannon, the transfer trauma suffered by a young

child when his home and family are at stake is predictable and substantial.5
John is likely to suffer significant harm as a direct result of government
action if he is taken from his established adoptive family. If the child is
transferred now, he will be cut off from everyone he has known throughout
his life and from every well-known place. He is too young to call or visit on
his own, and as a result, he will suffer a complete loss of his established
family. State action never isolates adults so completely from everyone they
know and love. Even an incarcerated or institutionalized adult is typically
afforded the right to communicate and perhaps to visit with family members. A child must be afforded a hearing in which his particular interests are
considered, before he is forced to suffer such a trauma.
4. The child has a constitutionally protected interest in protecting his
establishedfamilial relationships with his adoptive family.
Apart from his right to protection from the state-imposed harm. caused
by a change of custody, John has a separate and distinct right to protect his
established family relationships. This Court has previously declined an opportunity to determine whether a child has an independent due process
right to protect his familial relationships.6 As the issue remains unresolved,
this case presents an opportunity to recognize a child's right to protect his
established relationships. Here, John has never lived in a unified biological
family and was voluntarily placed for adoption by his birth mother. In addition, the adoptive parents had every expectation of being the child's permanent family.
From the child's perspective, his relationship with his adoptive family is
no different from the most traditional family relationships protected in the
past frbm state interference by this Court. "There does exist a 'private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter,'

. . .

that has been afforded both

substantive and procedural protection." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (citations and footnotes
omitted). This Court should recognize that John has at least an equal right to
protection of his established family as his birth father has to "possession" of
the child.

5. Author's Note: Citations to proof of harm in the record below, expert affidavits, or
secondary sources should be added here.
6. "We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship. We need not do so
here because, even assuming that such a right exists, [the child's] claim must fail." Michael
H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
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B. The Constitutional Rights of an Unwed Father Do Not Support an
Absolute Right to Veto an Adoption.
In denying a Petition for Rehearing in the case of In re Doe Justice
Heiple of the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
In
Illinois
married
custody

1972, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Stanley v.
ruled that unmarried fathers cannot be treated differently than unmothers or married parents when determining their rights to the
of their children. The courts of Illinois are bound by that decision.

In re Doe. 638 N.E.2d 181, 188 (IMI.) (Heiple, J., supplemental opinion in support of denial of rehearing) (citations omitted), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 499
(1994). The Illinois court misstated the holding in Stanley which merely
gave Mr. Stanley, who had a long-term relationship with his children, the
right to notice and a hearing before the children's removal from his custody.
Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). In the instant case, the X court
also relied heavily on the constitutional rights of the father to deny an adoption. This analysis ignores the Court's decisions subsequent to Stanley. each
clearly treating unmarried fathers differently than other parents in the context of adoptions. See Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that
unwed biological father was required to register with putative fathers' registry to preserve his right to notice of the adoption proceeding); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (distinguishing the rights of unwed fathers
who participate in the rearing of their children from those who do not);
Ouilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding statute preventing unwed
father from blocking adoption unless he had legitimated the child); cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110, 127, 129-30 (1989) (holding that due process rights of unwed biological father are not infringed upon by legal presumption that child born to married woman living with husband is a child
of the marriage). These cases established that while fathers may have certain
rights in the adoption process, they do not always have an absolute right to
veto the adoption.
The facts in Lehr are particularly illuminating. The unwed biological
father claimed that the biological mother concealed the whereabouts of the
newborn child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). The biological
father claimed that he continued his efforts to locate the child, with little
success, and when he did finally locate her, he visited her to the extent the
mother allowed. Id. After achieving "sporadic success" in finding the child
during the child's first two years of life, he was unable to contact her at all.
Id. A detective agency then helped him locate the child, and by that time,
the mother had married. He allegedly offered to provide financial assistance
for the child and to set up a trust for her, but the mother refused. She also
refused to allow the biological father to see the child and soon commenced
an adoption action against him. Id.
The Court held that the biological father's relationship with his daughter did not trigger constitutional protection where the father had "never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with her." Lehr,
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463 U.S. at 267. Indeed, the Court denied the father's right to intervene in
the adoption despite the fact that the biological mother had attempted to
conceal the child's whereabouts and had allegedly refused the father's offer
of financial support. Id. at 269. This Court has clearly distinguished "between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental
responsibility." Id. at 259-60.
The necessity of an existing relationship to trigger constitutional protection was reinforced by the Court in Quilloin v. Walcott 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
The Quilloin Court distinguished the father's situation from the father in
Stanley. noting that in Quilloin the biological father had never been a member of the child's family unit. Id. at 253. The Court placed great importance
on the fact that this was not "a case in which the proposed adoption would
place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never
before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full
recognition to a family unit already in existence ... ." Id. at 255. In
Quilloin the best interests of the child could be considered, because no relationship existed between the unwed father and the child. "Whatever might
be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in
this situation to find anything more than that the adoption ... [was] in the
'best interests of the child.'" Id.
Other state courts have granted an adoption over the objection of a
thwarted biological father who has established good cause for not having
acted sooner or more effectively to establish an actual relationship with his
child. See, e.g. In re Adoption of Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607 (Ark. 1992) (holding that a putative father with substantial relationship to child may be denied notice of an adoption proceeding if he fails to register with the state's
putative father registry); Appeal of H.R. (In re Baby Boy C.) 581 A.2d 1141
(D.C. 1990) (preference ,for fit unwed father who has "grasped his opportunity interest" may be overridden only by clear and convincing evidence that it
is in the child's best interest to be placed with nonrelatives); In re Adoption
of Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1992) (failure to provide child support,
even in absence of court order, was sufficient to terminate father's parental
rights).
Most recently, the Arizona Supreme Court in In re Juvenile Severance
Action No. S-114487 (Father in Tuvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 v.
Adam) 876 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. 1994), allowed the termination of an unwed
father's parental rights to free a child for adoption by applying a liberal
definition of "abandonment" to the case. The court relied heavily on Lehr:
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The ultimate question must be whether the father has, in fact created a
relationship. Even if this father had taken all possible steps to bond with his
child and failed, Lehr's message is that to protect his interest, and the
child's well-being, he must do more. For in the child's eyes, a valiant but
failed attempt to create a relationship means little. Severing long-established
bonds with others is equally harmful to the child, regardless of whether the
father first attempted to create a relationship.
In re Tuvenile Severance Action No. S-114487 876 P.2d at 1133. Note that
this reading of Lehr balances the rights of the child against the rights of the
father. The Lehr line of cases perhaps can be read to imply that the interests
of the child must be weighed against those of the unwed father.
Finally, the Uniform Adoption Ace allows termination of even a
thwarted father's parental rights. Unif. Adoption Act § 3-504(c)-(e) (1994).
Those rights may be terminated if the adoptive parents can prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that failure to terminate would be detrimental to
the child. Id. § 3-504(d). "Detrimental" is defined through the consideration
of various factors' including the comparative fault of the parties involved.
The Supreme Court of X improperly overstated respondent's right to
block the adoption at issue in this case. The constitutional rights of an unwed father do not include the absolute right to veto an adoption. However,
until this Court explicitly recognizes a child's right to due process in this
setting, other courts will continue to exaggerate the relative weight to be
given an unwed father's rights. The interests of the child must be weighed
against those of the unwed father.
C. The Constitutional Rights of an Unwed Father Do Not Provide an
Absolute Right to Custody of a Child if an Adoption Fails.
States have treated an adoption decision, which requires the termination
of biological parents' rights, differently than a custody decision, permitting
the trial court to consider the prospective adoptive parents as the child's custodial parents even after an adoption has failed. See, e.g., Cal. Fain. Code §
3041 (West 1994); In re Bistany, 145 N.E. 70 (N.Y. 1924) (denying adoption
by custodial parents on grounds that abandonment by natural parents had

7. At the annual meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Laws on August 4, 1994, forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Virgin Islands approved the Uniform Adoption Act for submission to the states
8. Section 3-504 (e) provides:
[T]he court shall consider any relevant factor, including the respondent's

Uniform State
Rico, and the
for enactment.
efforts to

obtain or maintain legal and physical custody of the minor, the role of other persons in thwarting the respondent's efforts to assert parental rights, the respondent's
ability to care for the minor, the age of the minor, the quality of any previous rela-

tionship between the respondent and the minor and between the respondent and
any other minor children, the duration and suitability of the minor's present custodial environment, and the effect of a change of physical custody on the minor.
Unif. Adoption Act, § 3-504(e).
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not been shown); Lemley v. Barr 343 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1986) (requiring
custody arrangement to serve best interests of child; although adoption had
been invalidated, court remanded for custody proceeding on appropriateness
of transfer from established, adoptive home to biological parents); Joan H.
Hollinger, Consent to Adoption in 1 Adoption Law and Practice § 2.01 (Joan
H. Hollinger ed., 1988 & Supp. 1994). No opinion of this Court has ever
given an unwed biological father an absolute right to the custody of his
child. Instead, the father's interest in custody should be weighed against the
child's interests as described below.
D. Where the Rights of an Unwed Father and Child Are in Conflict, the
State Must Provide a Remedy That Recognizes and Balances the
Respective Rights of Father and Child.,
Once it is established that the child has a liberty interest, either in protection from harmful state action or in protecting his established familial
relationships, "the question remains what process is due." Morrissey v.
Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). John is being removed from his established
family with no acknowledgment of his interests; therefore, the child has not
been provided due process. This Court does not face an evaluation of
whether existing process is adequate, because no process was afforded the
child. He will simply go to live with respondent as though he were "a bale
of hay," In re Clausen (DeBoer v. Schmidt). 502 N.W.2d 649, 668 (Mich.
1993) (Levin, J., dissenting), a piece of property not affected by the change of
families.
Instead, John should be guaranteed a hearing considering his interests
to determine whether the adoption should be granted, notwithstanding his
0
At the hearing, the trial
biological father's efforts to stop the adoption."
court should determine whether or not failure to grant the adoption will be
detrimental" to John. See Unif. Adoption Act § 3-504(c)-(e) (1994).
Other due process protections may also be warranted. The conflict between the welfare of the child and the interests of the biological father is
often caused, in these cases, by the amount of time the litigation consumes.

9. Author's Note: This section needs further development. I offer my thoughts and raise
the following questions: Should the father be granted any presumption? Should there first be
a hearing to determine adoption, then custody? Should the alternative of custody be argued
at this juncture in the case? What facts should be considered relevant at the hearing? Is a
hearing the best way to balance the rights of father and child, or should there be a presumption based upon the child's age or the length of time in a parent's care that obviates the
need for a hearing?
10. A similar hearing should be available to determine the custody of John if the adoption ultimately fails. A trial court could potentially make a finding as to the adoption as well
as to custody after a thorough hearing, eliminating the need for two hearings and further
delay.
11. Rather than employing "the best interest of the child test," the "detriment" test focuses on the needs and interests of the child and not on the comparative wealth and education
of the adults. See Unif. Adoption Act § 3-504(e).
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Each year the child is in the custody of the adoptive parents makes losing
those parents more traumatic for the child. Imposition of time limits on state
courts for finalizing adoptions (where no party may reopen the case for any
reason after the final appeal) would aid in guaranteeing a fair process for
the child. Another possible protection would be a "bright line" rule which
places biological parents on notice that no adoption can be re-opened more
than one year after the child's birth for any reason. Setting such time limits
might drastically reduce the number of cases that would require a hearing as
set out above.
II. CONCLUSION
Where a child is a member of an established, loving family, he should
not be removed from that family by the state without due process of law.
Automatically denying an adoption and removing a child from his established family, with no acknowledgment of the effect of that removal on the
child, violates the child's constitutional rights. He has a right to due process
because of the significant risk of transfer trauma upon his removal from his
established family. In addition, he has a right to due process to protect his
established relationship with his prospective adoptive parents.
The child should not be the prize granted to the winner of the litigation. He is a person with the right to have his personhood meaningfully
considered by any court with the power to change his life forever. Therefore,
John respectfully requests remand to the trial court for a hearing to balance
his rights against the rights and interests of his biological father to determine
whether or not the adoption should be granted. If the adoption is denied,
John respectfully requests a hearing to determine legal custody (short of
adoption), again balancing his rights and interests with those of his biological father.

I

